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9 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. REBER

SUBJECT: 25X1C8a
Dissemination of Intelligence Material to [REDACTED]

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REFERENCE: 1. Memorandum for Chief, I&SS, from AD/CD,
dated 27 October 1950, subject "Dissemination
of NIS Materials to [REDACTED]" 25X1C8a

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1. In a discussion on the general subject of "Dissemination to [REDACTED]" held with [REDACTED] of I and SS, a good many detailed problems were brought out that were not apparent from the discussion with Dr. Andrews. Most of these problems deal with the mechanics of the I&SS function with respect to the clearance of intelligence material for transmission to foreign governments.

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2. With reference to the broad clearance function he was performing, [REDACTED] felt that he and Dr. Andrews would arrive at a solution satisfactory to both. He felt that procedures could be set up where documents of a certain type and classification could be cleared immediately once the policy determination had been made. He could see no problem from the referenced textual source as raised by Dr. Andrews (paragraph 6, Reference 1). However, he did raise several questions on documents that he had been requested to clear. The documents in question were NIS elements, but the questions raised apply to all material being screened for transmission to a foreign government.

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a. The first question was whether these documents fell within the category of the "need to know" policy. OCD and the NIS division requested transmission, but he had no assurance that the material was of such a nature that the foreign government required it. [REDACTED] felt that it was not his responsibility to determine this fact, but rather in this case, up to the NIS division to decide by reference back through the originating agencies.

b. The second question he raised was concerning the approval of the originating agencies to allow transmission of this material to a foreign government. Again he felt that he did not have sufficient information to make this decision. In this case he did not feel that the blanket authority for dissemination "except where specifically noted therein" (enclosure to Reference 1) was sufficient grounds to meet MIC policy.

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c. The third question was in regard to screening the material to insure that no derogatory remarks toward the proposed recipient government were included in the documents to be transmitted. This must be done and he felt that it was not up to I&SS to read every document for this purpose.

3. As a general statement he felt that I&SS was being looked upon as the final clearing authority and that other offices were slighting their responsibilities, leaving it up to I&SS to pick up all loose ends.

4. He pointed out that another type of problem that frequently arises concerns important foreign visitors. The prospective arrival of such visitors is often completely unknown to certain offices within CIA who should be apprised of the visit. Also the visit of an important foreign official often brought up many other problems. Such an official often desired to discuss as well as obtain many intelligence documents. Even though this could be cleared it did encourage transmission through other than normal channels as set up with the government in question.

Recommendations:

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5. I believe that the problems [redacted] brought up can be settled to the mutual satisfaction of I&SS and the other offices concerned. An explanation of the I&SS position should be such that procedures could be set up to eliminate the continued recurrence of this type problem. It would be to everyone's advantage to have routine procedures to speed up the authorized transmission as well as insure that such transmission was completely within policy. I believe COAPS can be of assistance in bringing the interested offices together to work out procedures to expedite the authorized transmission of intelligence material to [redacted] and other authorized foreign governments.

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